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Abstract: In his article, “On the Processes of Subjectivation as a Subspecies of the Event: the Deleuzian 
Reading of the Later Foucault” Francisco Alcala discusses the well-known theoretical separation that 
occurred between Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault after the publication of The Will to Knowledge. 
Deleuze disagreed with the new function that Foucault attributed in this book to the apparatuses of 
power (to be constitutive of truth) because he considered that such an approach denied an inherent 
status to the phenomena of resistance, making all reality a truth of power. The aim of this paper is to 
analyze this controversy: first, from the confrontation of the concepts of apparatus and assemblage that 
made it appear; secondly, from the Deleuzian interpretation of the Foucaultian topic of the processes of 
subjectivation as a subspecies of the event, which finally resolves it. 
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Francisco J. ALCALÁ 
 
Of the Processes of Subjectivation as a Subspecies of the Event: the Deleuzian Reading of 
the Later Foucault. 
 
The separation, both theoretical and personal, that occurred between Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault 
after the publication of The Will to Knowledge is well known. Deleuze referred to it, after Foucault’s 
death, in an interview in 1986, which was later published in Negotiations. Aside from expressing 
sadness, these declarations repeat a question which Deleuze would return to again and again in other 
interviews given during that period: Foucault had, in his last years, been through some kind of crisis on 
all levels – political, personal and, of course, philosophical – which had led him to a certain seclusion 
that distanced him from his less intimate friends: “I'm afraid I didn't see him in the last years of his life: 
after the first volume of The History of Sexuality he went through a general crisis, in his politics, his life, 
his thought. As with all great thinkers, his thought always developed through crises and abrupt shifts 
that were the mark of its creativity, the mark of its ultimate consistency. I got the impression that he 
wanted to be left alone, to go where none but his closest friends could follow him. I needed him much 
more than he needed me” (Deleuze, Negotiations 83). 
In an attempt to regain a closer relationship with Foucault, for whom he felt a mix of sincere affection 
and profound philosophical admiration, Deleuze wrote him a letter immediately after the publication of 
The Will to Knowledge in 1977, sending it to him via François Ewald. It is thanks to the testimony of this 
intermediary that we know of the intention that Deleuze harboured in that letter, in which he expresses 
his impressions with respect to the development of the philosophy of Foucault that his newly published 
book entailed. Among other things of notable importance, Deleuze considered that The Will to Knowledge 
constitutes a new advance with respect to Discipline and Punish, to the extent in which it confers a 
clearly more ambitious function to the apparatus (dispositif) of power: the old normalizing function 
through the formation of knowledge is replaced by a constituent function – constituent of nothing less 
than truth, of a truth of power (Deleuze, Two Regimes 123; Foucault, Discipline 183, 306). 
The main problem posed by this new function that Foucault attributed to the apparatuses of power 
is that of the phenomena of resistance, insofar as they react against the former, must pass through the 
same channels, not being able to be either ideological or anti-repressive (Deleuze, Foucault 28-29). 
Regarding the status of the phenomena of resistance, Deleuze notices three possible directions in 
Foucault’s work published thus far: first, in The Will to Knowledge, in which these phenomena were a 
kind of “inverted image of the apparatuses,” which their antagonistic action opposed (Deleuze, Two 
Regimes 125-126; Foucault, The Will 95-96); second, that suggested in “The political function of the 
intellectual,” which explores the possibility of countering that truth of power with a power of the truth, 
as a counter-strategic response to strategy (Foucault, Dits 109-114); lastly, a third way that passes 
through the route of the body and its pleasures, outlined in the second volume of The History of 
Sexuality. Deleuze considers that the three directions seem to lead into a dead end: “He finds 
ammunition which can be turned against power? But I don't see how. We will have to wait for Michel to 
give his new conception of truth, on the micro analytical level” (Two Regimes 128-29). 
In contrast to this crossroads in which Foucault’s thought found itself, Deleuze stresses that, in the 
context of his philosophy, the status of the phenomena of resistance is not a problem insomuch as it is 
prior to the relations of force, to power; in the same way as the plane of consistency is prior to the plane 
of organization.  
It should not be forgotten that in Deleuze’s thought the plane of consistency is the plane of 
immanence that corresponds to the realm of Nature; the milieu of the relations of power, however, 
corresponds to the plane of organization that, mediated by a transcendent instance or a foundation, 
stratifies Nature, distributing the free singularities that populate it in accordance with the demands of 
the double articulation. It is not in vain that Deleuze and Guattari declare, in a chapter of A Thousand 
Plateaus eloquently entitled “The Geology of Morals”, that the strata that distribute the earth, imposing 
a form or an organization to its intensive matter, established through transcendent principles, are 
“judgements of God” (Deleuze and Guattari 40).  
The earth is, on the contrary, informal matter, nomadic distribution of singularities not yet rooted in 
stable relations, putting up an almost inertial resistance (deterritorialization) to the shoves of the strata 
or organization (reterritorialization), a disjunctive synthesis that is none other than that of the 
univocality of Being, opposing any attempt to make the earth pass through the double articulation of 
the God-Lobster, distributing it into categories, genres, species, hierarchies… forms of content and forms 
of expression. From this it follows that the deterritorialization carries out the same function in the sphere 
of the earth that univocality performs in that of Being. The same question remains: the need to assume 
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the defoundation in which thought will have to develop, withdrawing all the spheres over which thought 
is exerted from both foundation and its action, the distribution of judgement (Lapoujade 39, 57). The 
atheism of Nature precedes, in any case, the judgements of God, which capture the natural intensities 
giving rise to the strata of organization that configure the terrestrial surface. Consequently, the plane 
of consistency of the earth is prior to the plane of organization that is unfolded on its stratified surface 
and the diagram of forces that acts as an abstract machine of both planes is necessarily ambivalent: on 
one side, it presents a diagrammatic pole, the essential instability of which refers to the movements of 
deterritorialization that come from the plane of consistency; on the other, it presents a programmatic 
pole that is found beforehand subordinated to the plane of organization and to the reterritorializations 
that it operates.   
Deleuze appears to understand that to the extent that Foucault describes the apparatuses in terms 
of power relations, he conceives exclusively one sole type of diagram in this moment of his research: 
the programmatic diagram linked to the plane of organization. In Foucauldian thought, therefore, it is 
the apparatuses of power and the truth they constitute that have the last word: if all apparatus is an 
apparatus of power, set up on a programmatic diagram and carried out on a plane of organization, the 
status of the phenomena of resistance stays relegated to second place, not capable of being understood 
as anything but a reaction to power. While he conceives, as we have seen, a pole of the diagram 
corresponding to the plane of immanence, Deleuze remains unconvinced by the dead end of power 
where Foucault’s investigations seem to end up at this point in their development: “I would say that the 
collective field of immanence, where assemblages are made at a given point in time and where they 
trace their flight lines, also has a veritable diagram (...) I can stop since two very different types of 
planes would be interacting here: a kind of transcendent plane of organization against the immanent 
plane of assemblages. We would fall back into the previously mentioned problems. And, from there on, 
I no longer know how to situate myself in terms of Michel's present research” (Two Regimes 133). 
Suffice it to add that the assemblage the diagram of the plane of immanence or of consistency makes 
is the war machine, which corresponds neither to the State and its military institutions nor with the 
Foucauldian apparatus of power. Its nature is molecular – that which carries out the diagram as plane 
of organization is the State, of molar nature. The two poles that the diagram presents appear then to 
be extended in a double nature that also divides the assemblages. We shall now examine this, as well 
as the relation that is established accordingly between the assemblage and the apparatus.  
Deleuze himself had already emphasized that a certain indeterminacy seems to hang over the 
concept of assemblage, rendering its nature enigmatic to the extent that it can refer to strongly 
territorialized institutions, to deterritorializing intimate formations and even to the plane of immanence 
that the former bury and on which the latter take place. Zourabichvili stressed that more than a sole, 
equivocal use by the author, this disparity of cases of assemblage refers to two complicated poles in the 
concept itself, which illegitimates all dualism between desire and the institution or the molar and the 
molecular. Zourabichvili therefore distinguishes a double nature in all assemblage, which can only be 
elucidated insofar as the predominance of one of the poles can be confirmed, the stratified pole in the 
molar assemblages and the abstract machine pole in the molecular assemblages, the reterritorialization 
movements or those of deterritorialization, in such a way that the former consist of “large social 
assemblages defined by specific codes, and characterized by a relatively stable form and a reproductive 
operation: they tend to collapse the field of experimentation of the individual’s desire back onto a pre-
established formal distribution”; and the latter consist of “specific assemblages that “decode” the 
stratified assemblages or “put them into flight”” (Zourabichvili 146). The way in which the individual 
participates in those large molar assemblages lies in these other molecular assemblages, in which the 
individual himself/herself is caught. In short, every assemblage “looks” both to the plane of consistency 
and to the strata of organization, by virtue of the two poles that correspond to it. Yet, the movements 
of deterritorialization advanced by the plane of consistency of the desire in which the assemblages are 
encoded always seem to prevail.  
Consequently, if the assemblage can be both molar and molecular and if the Foucauldian apparatus 
ultimately lies in relations of power, more than opposing the apparatus the assemblage must subsume 
it as one of its components. This is how Deleuze understands it when he identifies the apparatuses of 
power with the reterritorializations that take place in the assemblages, also – and even principally – 
subject to movements of deterritorialization. Such assemblages or apparatuses of desire are those that 
hold authentic constitutive power of which the apparatuses of power naturally participate, but only to 
the extent in which they form a part of them (Two Regimes 125). 
Lastly, we will try to examine the nature of desire as Deleuze conceived it: from desire comes the 
status of the phenomena of resistance that he sees as missing in Foucault’s work up to 1977.   
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Although Foucault described the apparatuses in terms of power relations in Discipline and Punish, 
Deleuze openly expresses his reservations about this, understanding that the assemblages cannot help 
but be described in terms of desire (Two Regimes 124). Being impersonal and intensive individuation, 
desire in Deleuze can be characterized as a distribution of free pre-individual singularities or singularities 
of resistance, belonging to the plane of consistency where they distribute the social field in assemblages 
from which, strictly speaking, they cannot be distinguished. Desire is, hence, a distribution of 
singularities still not involved in the established power relations, characteristic instead of the 
programmatic pole of the diagram of forces and of their integration that takes place on the level of the 
plane of organization: “for me, power is an affection of desire” (Two Regimes 125), states Deleuze. This 
shows the derived nature of power as opposed to desire on an ontological level.  
Therefore, far from firstly giving an account of the established rule of the organization and relations 
of power, the philosophy of Deleuze shows the phenomena of resistance: desire, free singularity, line of 
flight… as first determinations that precede the power relations defined in the programmatic pole of the 
diagram, which are produced by them and are situated on them as on moving earth. What needs 
explanation in this thought are rather the organization of the strata of knowledge and the programmatic 
diagrams on which they are laid – in other words, the fixed relations of power and the knowledge that 
is a function of them. There is thus no room for doubt about the precedence of the phenomena of 
resistance versus those of power in Deleuzian thought and, particularly, of the assemblage of desire as 
opposed to the apparatus of power (Two Regimes 129). 
This being so, the assemblage lies on the movable floor of the plane of consistency, on the points of 
deterritorialization that the lines of flight must cross, which must determine both the expiry of the 
assemblages and the transit from one to others. Resistance is, in short, ontologically prior to power 
relations in Deleuze’s thought and therefore, the flight from some apparatuses to others equally 
precedes the establishment of these in law. 
Needless to say that we have here one of the biggest sticking points between the philosophies of 
Foucault and Deleuze which concerns the status of the phenomena of power and of resistance and 
consequently, the contrast between the apparatus and the assemblage, the former positioned on the 
plane of organization and the latter on the plane of consistency. Zourabichvili has shown that differences 
that separate the thought of Deleuze and Foucault can be evaluated around the notion of assemblage 
(148). Foucault’s situation is certainly more awkward than that of Deleuze. Bearing in mind that he 
characterizes the apparatus as apparatus of power, linked as such to the programmatic pole of the 
diagram and to the plane of organization, so that it has the reproductive or reterritorializing 
characteristics of the Deleuzian molar assemblage, Foucault comprehends resistance as a reality derived 
from the relations of power: “where there is power, there is resistance” (The Will to Knowledge 95). He 
understood that it is always a question of a second-order phenomenon, of a reaction whose domain is 
the space of freedom and of creation, which the action directed to control of the action, the action of 
power, leaves in the action of whoever undergoes it. Consequently, if resistance is a phenomenon 
without its own status and if, therefore, power has the last word concerning the apparatuses that 
distribute the social field in strata of organization, the variations of the diagram and, hence, those of 
the assemblages, remain unexplained in Foucault’s thought with no other status for resistance being 
discerned other than the reactive. So how would the mutations in the relations of forces that give rise 
to socio-political change be explained in his philosophy? (Fréderic Gros set forth the problem in similar 
terms in an interesting article [“Le Foucault” 60]). 
The text “The political function of the intellectual” also provides a good example of this particular 
conception of resistance. In it, Foucault discerns the emergence of a new type of intellectual in the 
second half of the 20th century: the rise of the specific intellectual is due, in brief, to the idiosyncrasy of 
the knowledge that each holds, touchstone of the regime of truth in their time. To this extent, the 
political problem is to constitute a new politics of the truth, to separate power from the truth of the 
hegemonic power, countering the truth of power with this power of the truth as counter-strategy 
(Foucault, Dits 114).  
Accordingly, in earlier texts, both from 1976, Foucault gives a counter-strategic foundation to the 
phenomena of resistance, explaining them on a strictly strategic level: in the first text, as reaction 
provoked in the oppressed pole of the power relation; and in the second, as tied to a supposed power 
of the truth that would be its repository, to the extent to which it had been disconnected from the 
hegemonic forms of power of which truth was a function, in order to be associated with other rebellious 
powers. In both cases, resistance is still the product of a power and takes place in the sphere of strategy. 
This is why the supposed power of the truth clearly continues to be a truth of power.  
Only three years later, however, there is a significant change in Foucault’s position in the text 
“Useless to revolt?” that appears to bring him closer to Deleuze’s thesis. It is a text in which he analyses 
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the phenomenon of uprisings, in which individuals make history in a literal sense, by opposing the 
powers. It is in this sense that Foucault refers to the revolt as to that phenomenon in which “subjectivity 
(not that of great men, but that of anyone) is brought into history, breathing life into it” (Essential 452), 
describing, also, the morality that guided his work as an intellectual as anti-strategic, positioned on the 
side of the universal rights of those singularities that revolt against power, giving foresight of a divorce 
between both instances, that of subjectivity and that of power. If henceforth the singularities have an 
absolute value in themselves with independence from all general economy and if the observance of 
universal rights or principles must also prevail in every action of power, how could the action of power 
continue developing positively and how could the singularities continue to be a function of that power 
that tends to sacrifice them?  
Whatever the case, for Deleuze resistance is an ontologically primary phenomenon, although it can 
in fact be supplanted ad nauseam by the relations of power that oppose it with such vehemence: 
resistance is always first, prior to power in the sphere of the law. It is, consequently, power that must 
be founded or explained and not resistance, which gives an account of itself. This is an instance that 
would be responsible for explaining, therefore, all the mutations of the diagram as its opposition in the 
strict sense to the strata of organization that are erected upon it. Such an explanation clearly contrasts 
with the interpretation of the matter that, at least up until 1976, predominated in the work of Foucault.   
It was not until the publication of Lives of Infamous Men and, above all, of the two later volumes of 
The History of Sexuality, that Deleuze was reconciled with Foucault’s thought, stating in the introduction 
to the theme of the processes of subjectivation the explanation of the status of the phenomena of 
resistance that he felt was needed. The question inevitably arises: how to cross the line, how to find in 
the power that is constitutive of truth a power of the truth that is not already a truth of power, that is 
to say, a truth that is derived from the transversal lines of resistance and not from the lines that are 
integral to power? “I will be told: ‘That’s so like you, always with the same inability to cross the line (…) 
always the same choice, on the side of power, of what it says or causes to be said. Why not go listen to 
these lives where they speak in their own voice?’” (Foucault, Essential 161). 
Foucault found the answer to this question in the processes of subjectivation, as power of the truth 
or third axis that differs equally from the axes of power and knowledge, to the extent that it constitutes 
an outside common to both. In this regard, Deleuze understands that the very operation of 
subjectivation is the direction of the force that is man upon himself, self-government or fold of the force 
that constitutes a Self that evades both power relations and the formations of knowledge that are a 
function of them. It is both the stratum and the strategy because it consists of an interiorization or a 
fold of the outside that clearly differs both from the interiority commonly attributed to the subject and 
from the mere exteriority of the world of the senses (Foucault 97, 110).  
In other words, what is defining of the outside is force, and force is essentially relation with other 
forces: it is, therefore, inseparable from power, from the power to affect and be affected. So it is not 
surprising that a relation emerges of force with itself as government of self that makes possible 
government over others. The Greek diagram established that only free men could dominate others, but, 
to do so it was necessary for these free men first to be capable of dominating themselves. It is therefore 
necessary that the relation with others doubles a relation with themselves, that from the moral codes 
that implement the diagram in the different spheres (city, family, …) a subject is freed who no longer 
depends on the code in his interior. Such is the great merit, as Deleuze understands it, that Foucault 
attributes to the Greeks: they have folded force without it ceasing to be force, relating it with itself and 
removing it through this astuteness from its relational nature, from its dependence with respect to 
power. Thus they invented the subject, but as the product of a process of subjectivation. Foucault’s 
fundamental idea is that of a subjectivity that, despite arising from power and from knowledge, no 
longer depends on them. Hence, rather than a return to the subject, Deleuze observes in the later 
Foucault a growing interest in the processes of subjectivation, as acts of resistance to power par 
excellence.  
Therefore, Deleuze distinguishes an evolution through three ontologies in Foucault’s thought, each 
which subsumes the previous and constitutes by itself an answer to the question “what does it mean to 
think?”: an ontology of knowledge (epistemology), an ontology of power (strategy) and an ontology of 
self (topology or subjectivation). The third ontology is sketched in The Use of Pleasure, and in it he 
leaves both the strata and strategy to go into topology, discovering the processes of subjectivation. The 
fold of force appears, therefore, when the forms are already interconnected, giving rise to a “self” in 
which the outside constitutes a co-extensive inside.  
As the third axis that evades knowledge and power, the processes of subjectivation have great 
importance regarding socio-political struggles and change, that is, regarding the historic step from some 
assemblages to others, history of the assemblages inspired by the becoming of the diagrams, with the 
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always “untimely” creation as horizon. They present, in this sense, an eminent vocation for 
transgression, which counters the general laws of nature and of morals with its facultative, ethical and 
aesthetic legality – and this up to the point that Deleuze refers to these processes of subjectivation as 
“the extreme edge of an apparatus [dispositif],” which escapes the powers and knowledge of the present 
apparatus in order to end up reinserting itself in those of a future apparatus, whose forms it anticipates 
(Two Regimes 341-42). 
This leads us to wonder about the logic that inspires this new creation in the assemblage, which is 
that of counter-effectuation, and which similarly explains the link that exists between subjectivation and 
event: in order to elucidate it, we need to go back to where the event is made the central theme, from 
The Logic of Sense to A Thousand Plateaus.  
The pure event, as expressed in the proposition that is attributed to the bodies in The Logic of Sense 
(Deleuze 22), has an essential relation with language without being linguistic itself and is ascribed or 
effectuated in the bodies without being bodily itself, so that it connects both divergent series according 
to the irrational logic of disjunctive synthesis, the non-relation as a more profound relation (Zourabichvili 
167-171). Exteriority of the relations ensures immanence and avoids relapse into a representative 
system: a system, in other words, that is founded once and for all on principles whose transcendence 
is passed on to the relation that links the bodies and the propositions. The event is, therefore, a 
paradoxical instance that explains the genesis of sense in language, that is to say, it explains that 
language “functions” in fact in the world, even though in law no relation at all is established between 
the series of the bodies and that of the propositions.   
Looking to broaden their earlier research in the social field, in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and 
Guattari redefine the event in the framework of the assemblage as an instantaneous and incorporeal 
act or transformation that, made in enunciations, is nonetheless attributed to the bodies of a society. 
The two segments of this assemblage translate the Stoic duality between the mixtures of bodies and 
propositions that expressed the events, making it come to earth in history and shaping the stratum of 
knowledge. The heterogeneous series of The Logic of Sense are pulled down to the terrestrial surface 
giving rise to the form of content and the form of expression. 
The event in A Thousand Plateaus is therefore an instance of intermediate or paradoxical nature that 
relates two heterogeneous series in accordance with the irrational logic of disjunctive synthesis. The 
event thus inaugurates a mode of inserting the expression into the contents and of intervening in them 
at the level of the diagram, setting the assemblage to alter, that is, determining whether the movements 
of deterritorialization and molecular nature predominate in it. The following gives an eloquent account 
both of the anticipation of the enunciation with respect to the content in the event and of the relevance 
that the processes of subjectivation it entails have regarding socio-political change: “This text 
constituted an incorporeal transformation that extracted from the masses a proletarian class as an 
assemblage of enunciation before the conditions were present for the proletariat to exist as a body. A 
stroke of genius from the First Marxist International, which ‘invented’ a new type of class: Workers of 
the world, unite!” (Deleuze and Guattari 83). 
The logical sequence is therefore as follows: first, there is an event as incorporeal (of sense) act or 
transformation that goes unnoticed and extracts an assemblage of enunciation that realizes it. The 
influence of Guattari’s ideas are evident here, referring to these incorporeal transformations in terms of 
significant breakthrough (240-41). Second, that event-assemblage carries within it a process of 
subjectivation, which is to say that it causes a new subjectivity that establishes equally new relations 
with all spheres of life: the force that is man is directed upon itself, evading the power relations and 
forms of knowledge of the present assemblage, such that what before was quotidian now proves 
intolerable. Lastly, there is the need to counter-effectuate the event, that is, to create new assemblages 
that respond to the call of a people that have need of the new subjectivity, situating individuals and 
societies at the height of what is happening (to them): it is in these completely new assemblages that 
the subjectivity that inspired them, anticipating their forms, will be reinserted.  
With the aim of examining this in detail, let us turn to another example: “May ’68 is more of the 
order of a pure event (...) a visionary phenomenon, as if a society suddenly saw what was intolerable 
in it and also saw the possibility for something else. It is a collective phenomenon in the form of: ‘Give 
me the possible, or else I'll suffocate.’ The possible does not pre-exist, it is created by the event. It is a 
question of life. The event creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity” (Two Regimes 233-
34). Consequently, it demands that "society must be capable of forming collective agencies (…) that 
match the new subjectivity, in such a way that it desires the mutation" (234). Therefore, in its dimension 
as an event, the French 1968 is not, as historians claim, an empirical consequence to explain through a 
retrospective reconstruction of the causes, but an incorporeal cause that happened as such unnoticed, 
giving rise to all the occurrences that took place later. Hence Deleuze and Guattari conclude that it is 
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not that ’68 has been overcome, since “even if the event is ancient, it can never be outdated: it is an 
opening onto the possible" (233). On the contrary, it was French society that was not up to the event: 
“French society has shown a radical incapacity to create a subjective redeployment on the collective 
level, which is what '68 demands” (234). 
Contravening equally the transcendent selection operated by metaphysics and the rejection of 
selection that is characteristic of negative nihilism, Deleuze established an immanent criterion of 
selection regarding the assemblages: the power of novelty and of creation that they express. In this 
respect, subjectivity constitutes the bastion of newness in the assemblage, placing in communication, 
as subspecies of the event, the deterritorializing pole of the assemblage with the diagrammatic pole of 
the abstract machine and, in short, the assemblage with the plane of consistency and the diagram whose 
becomings – deterritorialization – determine the history of its variations – reterritorializations. The 
creation of possibles through the event, to which Deleuze frequently alludes, eminently concerns 
subjectivation, which is raised in “the final dimension of apparatuses.” This makes it possible to judge 
or select them “according to immanent criteria, according to their content in ‘possibilities’, freedom, 
creativity with no call to transcendental values” (Two Regimes 343-44). Being a bastion of creation, the 
processes of subjectivation constitute the yardstick by which to measure in the future the height of 
those assemblages to come that succeed in counter-effectuating the event, placing individuals and 
societies at the height of what happens to them in the event. Therefore, “each apparatus [dispositive] 
is thus defined by its content of newness and creativity, which at the same time indicates its ability to 
change or even to break for the sake of a future apparatus [dispositif], unless, on the contrary, there is 
an increase of force to the hardest, most rigid and solid lines. Since they escape the dimensions of 
knowledge and power, lines of subjectivation seem particularly apt to trace paths of creation, which are 
constantly aborted but also taken up again and modified until the old apparatus [dispositif] breaks” (Two 
Regimes 344-45).  
Counter-effectuation is now understood as politics of the event, leaving behind its conception as 
ethics of the event that was present in The Logic of Sense. It was then said that either the moral has 
no meaning or it only has one: “not to be unworthy of what happens to us,” but “to will and release the 
event” (149). Counter-effectuating the event that is realized in our body was, hence, “to give to the 
truth of the event the only chance of not being confused with its inevitable actualization” (161), making 
that truth the object of an affirmation with independence from our particular fortune or misfortune: 
impersonal Death is turned against all deaths, including one’s own. Here is the point where amor fati 
and the battle of free men come together, safeguarding the insurmountable nature of the pure event: 
“Amor fati, to want the event, has never been to resign oneself (…) but (…) to counter-effectuate the 
event, to accompany that effect without body, that part which goes beyond the accomplishment” 
(Deleuze and Parnet 65). The ethical aspect of the counter-effectuation thus concerns the individual 
who “not only comprehends and wills the event, but also represents it and, by this, selects it, and that 
an ethics of the mime necessarily prolongs the logic of sense" (Deleuze, The Logic 147). 
We should now consider the shift from ethics to the politics of the mime. Although it may seem that 
the concept of counter-effectuation has become unrecognizable from The Logic of Sense to A Thousand 
Plateaus, in both cases it is a question of a test of will that calls upon us to accompany the event up 
until its ultimate consequences, including those that involve an often painful corporeal effectuation. In 
the ethical dimension of counter-effectuation it was essential to be the mime of the event that was being 
effectuated in our body, in order to reach the surface of the pure event, limiting the effectuation to the 
instant without mixture (Aion) and thus allowing us to want the event. In A Thousand Plateaus we are, 
conversely, called to be the mime of the assemblages that make up the stratified surface of the earth 
(“mimic the strata,” [Deleuze and Guattari 160]), which constitute a kind of effectuation, in order to 
reach the pure surface of the plane of consistency, the mutations of which vary them according to the 
deterritorializing logic of the pure event, communicating the assemblage with the plane of consistency 
from which, ultimately, it originates, always passing through an abstract machine constituted as diagram 
and not as program. Here we discover the sense of the political dimension of counter-effectuation: rising 
from the effectuation in the stratum up to the plane of consistency, in favour of an effectuation to come 
(more “untimely” than simply future, connected as such to the event). It is now society, therefore, that 
must respond to the incorporeal event, wanting it even in the effectuation in the stratum of which it is 
the cause, insofar as its action on us is limited through the constitution of the assemblages that demand 
the new subjectivity and the event itself as future effectuation: the creation of new modes of being or 
styles of life is, as we have revealed, the immanent criterion of selection regarding the assemblages. 
In the political variation of counter-effectuation it is about creating new modes of being or lifestyles 
that place us at the height of what happens to us: the point at which the inversion of Platonism with its 
recognition of the power of the false (remember how Deleuze challenged the argument from privileged 
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experience in “Letter to a Harsh Critic”, adducing those affects and precepts as effects that could be 
obtained through media different to the “true” media of life experience or corporeal effectuation 
[Negotiations 11]; also his interpretation of the Foucauldian concept of fiction (Foucault 120) coincides 
with the philosophy of the event, to which it clears the way. Nor should we forget that the inversion of 
Platonism is in Deleuze, as in Nietzsche, explicitly related with the overcoming of negative nihilism as 
abandonment of the project of selection before the fall of the transcendent criteria through which it was 
realized. Selection based on immanent criteria on which Deleuze pinned anti-Platonism thus coincides 
with the creation of new modes of being or lifestyles as criteria in order to select the assemblages, which 
again shows the close relation that exists between the core themes of the inversion of Platonism and 
the philosophy of the event. Affirmative nihilism consists of producing novelty out of the nothing of 
being, therefore selecting what exists through its power of creation, joyful constructivism and immanent 
selection in which it is easy to recognise the Frenchman’s thought.  
It is, lastly, in virtue of this vocation for all-around manifest transgression that Deleuze understands 
that the processes of subjectivation, exactly as Foucault understands them, are a subspecies of the 
event associated with the constitution of a counter-knowledge, which consists of a minoritarian 
becoming of knowledge. Such counter-knowledge is not strategic anymore, in that it is subtracted from 
the sphere of power relations insofar as it derives from the lines of resistance. Therefore: 
“Subjectification isn't even anything to do with a "person": it's a specific or collective individuation 
relating to an event (...) it's a specific dimension without which we can't go beyond knowledge or resist 
power” (Negotiations 98-99). 
It should be noted here that the Kierkegaardian formula “Give me the possible, or else I'll suffocate!” 
is invoked by Deleuze both for the event and the processes of subjectivation. It is no wonder, for what 
is in play in Kierkegaard is, as Deleuze sees it, to “make something new of repetition itself: connect it 
with a test, with a selection or selective test; make it the supreme object of the will and of freedom” 
(Difference 6), opposing it to the general laws of nature and morals. Immanent creation and selection, 
whose facultative, ethical and aesthetic legality, which is neither moral nor individual but singular, 
agrees well with the reinterpretation of the processes of subjectivation in the wake of Foucault as outside 
of knowledge and power, which creates possibilities beyond the possible itself, in the virtual, assuming 
the exhaustion of all transcendent principle: a power of the truth, finally, against all the truths of power. 
“If you believe in the world you precipitate events, however inconspicuous, that elude control, you 
engender new space-times (...) Our ability to resist control, or our submission to it, has to be assessed 
at the level of our every move. We need both creativity and a people” (Negotiations 176). 
By way of conclusion, we must first stress the fact that Deleuze’s reinterpretation of the processes 
of subjectivation as a subspecies of the event that produces the historical change of the apparatuses 
leads to a general reinterpretation of Foucault’s thought, which would finally have found in subjectivation 
the longed-for status for the phenomena of resistance. To confirm it, it is enough to compare, for 
example, the optimist tenor of the text “What is a Dispositif?” (1988) with that mixture of prudence and 
reserve that characterizes the general tone of “Desire and Pleasure” (1977).  
This leads to the convergence of two lines of research in the Deleuzian reception of the Foucauldian 
theory of the processes of subjectivation. On the one hand, their thematization as a subspecies of the 
event works in favour of cultural and socio-political change, that is, of the creation of new modes of 
being or lifestyles both on an individual and a collective level. On the other hand, the study of discourse, 
both literary and philosophical, as a counter-knowledge associated with the processes of subjectivation, 
establishes a synergetic relation with them to the point that “style, in a great writer, is always a style 
of life too, not anything at all personal, but inventing a possibility of life, a way of existing” (Negotiations 
100). With the purpose of verifying the new status of counter-knowledge that now concerns philosophy 
and literature, one only needs to consult, respectively, the introductions of two of Deleuze’s last texts: 
Negotiations and Essays Critical and Clinical.  
A final horizon thus opens, one that is common to the philosophies of Foucault and Deleuze beyond 
the evident divergences regarding method and approach to problems, corresponding to the conviction 
that discourse (philosophical, literary, political…) has to be a machine for producing events (Morey 14).  
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